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Abstract 
 
In a model with ex-ante homogenous households, earnings risk and a general earnings 
function, we derive the optimal linear labor tax rate and optimal linear education subsidies. 
The optimal income tax trades off social insurance against incentives to work and to invest in 
human capital. Education subsidies are not used for social insurance, but are only targeted at 
off-setting the distortions of the labor tax and internalizing a fiscal externality. Both optimal 
education subsidies and tax rates increase if labor and education are more complementary, 
since education subsidies indirectly lower labor tax distortions by stimulating labor supply. 
Optimal education subsidies (taxes) also correct non-tax distortions arising from missing 
insurance markets. Education subsidies internalize a positive (negative) fiscal externality if 
there is underinvestment (overinvestment) in education due to risk. Education policy 
unambiguously allows for more social insurance if education is a risky activity. However, if 
education hedges against labor market risk, optimal tax rates could be lower than without 
education subsidies. 
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1 Introduction
Insuring human capital risks is one of the key roles of modern welfare states. Individuals
face large labor market risks during their working lives. They may become unemployed,
sick, disabled or they may experience loss of skill due to old age, health problems, tech-
nological changes, and globalization. Indeed, virtually all social benefits (for example
welfare, unemployment, sickness, disability, health, or old age benefits) provide insurance
against the loss of skill. Moreover, if individuals fail to acquire sufficient skills when
young, they are liable to become dependent on social insurance benefits later on in life.
Therefore, human capital policies could be necessary to avoid dependency on the wel-
fare state. Despite the obvious policy relevance, it is rather surprising that only a limited
number of papers have addressed the question of how social insurance should be organized
when human capital is subject to non-insurable risks. Moreover, it is not clear whether
education policy should be employed as a complementary policy to social insurance.
Some earlier papers have analyzed the implications of human capital risks for the
design of optimal insurance and/or education policy. See, for example, Eaton and Rosen
(1980a, 1980b), Hamilton (1987), and Anderberg and Andersson (2003). Grochulski
and Piskorski (2006), da Costa and Maestri (2007), and Anderberg (2008) follow the so
called new dynamic public finance approach to analyze optimal tax and education policies
when human capital is subject to risk. The findings in this literature differ, depending
on: the available policy instruments; whether linear or non-linear policy instruments are
chosen; and whether education increases or decreases earnings risk. None of these papers
explicitly derives answers to the following three questions.
Firstly, is the optimal amount of social insurance higher or lower when education
increases or reduces earnings risk? Anderberg and Andersson (2003, p. 1523) argue that:
“If human capital reduces earnings risk, encouraging education would seem to mitigate
the insurance / redistribution problem.” Hence, if education hedges against labor market
risk (increases labor market risk), the government needs to rely less (more) on social
insurance. However, this argument is not formally proven.
Secondly, should education policy correct under- or overinvestment in human capital,
or not? Human capital investment is typically inefficient, because risk-averse individuals
try to reduce their exposure to income risk in the presence of missing insurance markets.
Da Costa and Maestri (2007, p. 696) suggest that education policy is optimal if education
is a risk-increasing activity: “Optimal policies derived under these assumptions will then
prescribe ... educational subsidies to ameliorate the problem of under-investment in hu-
man capital.” Anderberg and Andersson (2003, p. 1523) argue in contrast that education
policy is also needed, but now when education hedges against income risk: “The insight
is thus that if education moderates wage uncertainty, a second-best policy should, rather
unambiguously, encourage the formation of human capital (relative to the first-best),
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while if education exacerbates wage uncertainty the overall conclusion is ambiguous.”
Thirdly, does the availability of education policy optimally increase the amount of
social insurance or not? Again, one would expect this to be true. For example, Bovenberg
and Jacobs (2005) demonstrate in deterministic settings that optimal education policy
typically lowers the cost of redistribution and thus raises optimal tax rates.
We demonstrate that the answers to these three questions are not trivial and can
be completely counterintuitive. Indeed, we show that all the suggested answers to the
questions raised above are either partially or completely incorrect. The aim of the present
paper is thus to clarify a number of important issues in this small literature and to provide
a number of new insights. We do so by developing a canonical model, which integrates the
previously studied approaches in order to characterize optimal linear tax and education
policies in risky economies.
We study a one-shot model of human capital investment and labor supply. Ex-ante
homogenous households differ ex-post due to the realization of idiosyncratic risk in their
ex-post income. Markets to insure earnings or human capital risks are missing. There-
fore, social insurance is welfare enhancing as we assume that there is no aggregate risk.
Social insurance takes the form of a linear income tax.1 Full insurance is impossible due
to the endogeneity of labor supply, which causes a moral hazard problem. We extend the
previous literature by employing a completely general earnings function that depends on
human capital investment, labor supply and a random variable reflecting the uncertain
state of nature. This general earnings function allows both for the possibility that edu-
cation is a risky activity that increases exposure to labor market risk and the possibility
that education reduces exposure, i.e., hedges, against labor market risk. Our model is
sufficiently general to fully explore the nature of optimal tax and education policies while
remaining analytically tractable. In doing so, our paper contributes in five major ways
to the existing literature.
Firstly, we provide the answer to the first question. We show that if educational
investment increases exposure to non-insurable income risks, the risk-premium acts as
a (pre-existing) implicit tax on human capital. Missing insurance markets therefore re-
sult in non-tax distortions, which generate fiscal externalities that need to be taken into
account when designing tax and education policies. Income taxes exacerbate (mitigate)
underinvestment (overinvestment) in human capital when insurance markets are missing,
so that income taxes should optimally be lower (higher) as a result. Therefore, if edu-
cation hedges against (increases) labor market risk, it is incorrect to argue that optimal
income taxes should be lower (higher) because individuals self-insure by overinvesting
(underinvesting).
Secondly, we answer the second question by demonstrating that education subsidies
1We restrict income taxes and education subsidies to be linear. Anderberg (2008) explores similar
questions with non-linear instruments.
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are not used for insurance. Indeed, when there is no social insurance, governments cannot
improve upon the laissez faire outcome by subsidizing education as this will upset the
optimal private response to market risk. As long as insurance markets are missing and
social insurance is unavailable, it is therefore incorrect to argue that governments should
correct under- or overinvestment in human capital with education subsidies.
Thirdly, we show that education subsidies are optimally employed in an income tax
cum education subsidy policy. Indeed, subsidies on education are optimal only in com-
bination with social insurance in order to mitigate the tax and non-tax distortions as-
sociated with social insurance. The first role of education subsidies is to reduce the tax
distortions on labor supply if education is complementary to labor. Education subsidies
then boost labor supply, and thereby indirectly off-set the labor tax distortion on work
effort (see also Jacobs and Bovenberg, 2008).2 The second role of education subsidies is
to internalize the fiscal externality caused by under- or overinvestment in education. Da
Costa and Maestri (2007) are indeed correct to argue that education should be subsidized
if it is a risky activity, but only to the extent that subsidies are needed to internalize the
fiscal externality, and not to directly tackle over- or underinvestment (see the previous
point). Similarly, when education reduces labor market risk, lower education subsidies
(or even taxes) should optimally be used so as to off-set the non-tax distortion resulting
in overinvestment. If human capital hedges against income risks, and if individuals make
their own investment choices rather than the government making these choices, it is er-
roneous to conclude that private investment in human capital should be encouraged with
education subsidies for insurance reasons.
Fourthly, we answer the third question. When both tax and education policies are
optimized, we demonstrate that the design of social insurance becomes independent from
the question whether education is a risky investment or not. Therefore, ambiguities
arise as to whether more or less social insurance is provided compared to the optimal
tax policy without education subsidies. This crucially depends on the risk properties of
human capital and the complementarity of education and work. Consequently, optimal
education policy does not automatically allow for more social insurance.
Fifthly, our paper is the complement to Anderberg (2008) who analyzes non-linear
tax and education policies in comparable settings. We bolster his findings by showing
that the risk properties of human capital are critical in shaping human capital policies
also under much weaker informational assumptions. In particular, only aggregate labor
incomes and educational investments need to be verifiable to the government for linear
policy instruments to be employed. Moreover, our findings suggest that great care should
2This corresponds to the ‘revenue effect’ in Anderberg and Andersson (2003). This finding contrasts,
however, with Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005). They show that education should not be subsidized (on
a net basis) because education subsidies also generate inequality if more able individuals learn more
(‘ability bias’). This effect is absent here, since all individuals are ex ante identical and invest the same
amount in education.
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be taken when drawing inferences from the wedges that are now commonly analyzed in
the new dynamic public finance literature. We show that a tax wedge on education does
not prove that education is optimally taxed at the optimal second-best allocation, which
is decentralized through income taxes and education subsidies.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a survey of
the literature. Then the model is introduced in section 3. Section 4 discusses optimal tax
and education policies. The paper ends with conclusions and discussion in section 5.
2 Earlier Literature
Levhari andWeiss (1974) are the first to examine the effect of idiosyncratic risks on human
capital formation in the absence of well-functioning markets to insure these risks. As-
suming an exogenous labor supply decision (l¯), they postulate a general earnings function
Φ(θ, e, l¯) ≡ φ(θ, e), which denotes gross labor earnings and depends on a risky component
θ and the level of human capital investment (education) e. Typically, θ is seen as a ran-
dom variable with some ex ante known distribution. Levhari and Weiss (1974, p. 951)
distinguish between ‘input’ and ‘output’ risk in human capital investment. Input risk is
the risk of being successful in acquiring human capital due to, e.g., imperfect knowledge
about (learning) ability or about the quality of education. Output risk denotes the risk
in the returns to human capital arising from uncertainty about labor market conditions,
e.g., employment and wage risk.
Levhari andWeiss (1974) suggest that for input risk, it is quite ‘natural’ to assume that
Φθe > 0. Hence, income risk increases in the level of educational investment. Therefore,
risk averse individuals will reduce their exposure to the risk of failing by underinvesting
in human capital. Indeed, many papers suggest that human capital is risky.3 However,
Φθe > 0 may not be the most appropriate assumption to capture output risk. Typically,
better educated individuals experience less unemployment, sickness and wage risk (among
other things).4 Therefore, if education reduces the exposure to labor market risk, the cross
derivative of the earnings function is negative, i.e., Φθe < 0. Then, risk averse individuals
try to reduce their exposure against unfavorable labor market outcomes by overinvesting
in education, since education hedges against adverse labor market outcomes.
Self-insurance by over- or underinvesting is socially inefficient, although it is rational
at the individual level. Idiosyncratic income risks can be pooled, since the law of large
numbers ensures that there is no aggregate uncertainty. In principle, private insurance
3Palacios-Huerta (2004, 2006) shows that human capital is risky on average and even speaks of a
human capital premium puzzle, since the return to education is so high that it can only be explained by
implausibly huge coefficients of risk-aversion. Hartog (2005) reviews a whole literature that empirically
establishes risk-compensation in wages.
4See also Gould et al. (2000) and Belzil and Hansen (2004). Using an empirical approach, Palacios-
Huerta (2004, 2006) finds that the human capital premium is lowered as workers become better educated.
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should therefore be possible at very low or even no costs. Nevertheless, in the case of
human capital, private insurance markets tend to suffer from market failure and private
insurance is not (or only to a very limited extent) available due to moral hazard, adverse
selection, and various legal limitations in trading claims on human capital. See Sinn
(1996) for an elaborate discussion. Because private markets are incomplete, social wel-
fare could in principle be increased by public intervention. Although all social insurance
policies suffer from moral hazard problems,5 the government may overcome adverse selec-
tion and legal problems by providing mandatory social insurance against human capital
risk. How should optimal social insurance in that case be designed?
Eaton and Rosen (1980a) study the optimal design of social insurance at exogenous
levels of human capital (e¯). The earnings function is designated by Φ(θ, e¯, l) ≡ θl, so that
the risk factor θ enters in a multiplicative fashion. A proportional income tax is shown
to be preferable to pure lump-sum taxation. A proportional tax rate, while returning
the tax revenue as a deterministic lump-sum transfer, redistributes labor incomes across
states of nature and therefore provides insurance. However, redistribution also distorts
labor supply. Starting from a situation without income taxation, the welfare gain of
correcting missing insurance markets is first-order, while the labor supply distortion is
only second-order. Therefore, the income tax is optimally positive.6
The formal analysis of social insurance with endogenous human capital investment
began with the seminal paper by Eaton and Rosen (1980b). They use a multiplicative
modeling of risk, so that the earnings function looks like: Φ(θ, e, l) ≡ θφ(e)l, where
Φθe > 0, and education e is risk-increasing. Consequently, private educational investment
is below the socially desirable level. The introduction of a proportional income tax is
welfare-enhancing. The intuition is again that the income tax redistributes income from
favorable to unfavorable states of nature. By replacing missing insurance markets, the
linear income tax boosts risky human capital investment.7
Hamilton (1987) basically adopts the model of Eaton and Rosen (1980b), but in
addition analyzes taxes on savings. Hamilton points out that, even though taxation
provides some (social) insurance, there is still underinvestment in human capital, which
is socially inefficient. It would, therefore, be preferable to give the government full control
over human capital investment to avoid this underinvestment. Direct control of human
capital is, however, unrealistic in his view. Hamilton proposes an interest tax as indirect
subsidy on educational investment. Interest taxation decreases the opportunity costs
of human capital accumulation. A positive tax rate on interest, accompanying positive
proportional wage taxation, is shown to be optimal under the (very) strong assumptions
5See for example Wigger and von Weizsa¨cker (2001) for a detailed analysis.
6Varian (1980) derives similar results in a model with a risky return to capital investment and gen-
eralizes the result to non-linear income taxation.
7This analysis is extended to progressive labor taxation and the simultaneous use of education sub-
sidies in Schindler and Yang (2007).
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of (i) inelastic labor supply and (ii) either zero equilibrium savings or constant absolute
risk aversion.
Grochulski and Piskorski (2006) generalize the findings of Hamilton (1987) to non-
linear policy instruments without imposing the strong restrictions on the model, while
maintaining an earnings function with multiplicative risk: Φ(θ, e, l) ≡ θφ(e)l. At the same
time, they do not allow for education policy, as education is assumed to be non-verifiable
to the government. They show that labor supply carries a wedge (i.e., is distorted) for
insurance purposes. This is the analogous to the optimality of a distortionary labor tax.
Moreover, there is an intertemporal wedge in consumption choices, indicating a role for
capital income taxation. Firstly, the capital tax stimulates labor supply, and indirectly
reduces the labor tax distortion on labor supply (see also Diamond and Mirrlees, 1978,
1986; Golosov et al., 2003).8 Secondly, by lowering the opportunity costs, capital income
taxes give incentives to invest in human capital. This is optimal because the labor tax
discourages human capital investments, since costs of education are not tax-deductible.
Capital income taxes are optimally positive, because introducing a saving distortion is
only second-order, while removing the tax distortion on human capital is first-order. The
capital tax therefore improves the composition of overall saving while hurting the overall
level of both human and financial savings. See also Jacobs and Bovenberg (2005) who
obtain the same result even in the absence of risk.
Anderberg and Andersson (2003) are the first to simultaneously optimize linear tax
and education policies. They use a stripped-down version of the Eaton and Rosen (1980b)
model, while allowing for a more general earnings function, as in Levhari and Weiss
(1974). In particular, gross labor earnings depend on a stochastic factor θ, educational
investment e, and labor l: Φ(θ, e, l) ≡ φ(θ, e)l. Both risk-increasing (Φθe > 0) and risk-
decreasing (Φθe < 0) cases are considered. Anderberg and Andersson (2003) assume that
the government fully and directly controls educational investment. Also these authors
obtain a trade-off between social insurance and tax-induced distortions in labor supply.
In addition, they find that the use of education policy generates a ‘revenue creation
effect’ because labor supply and education are complementary activities, so that education
policy can mitigate the tax distortions on labor supply. Moreover, education policy
entails an ‘insurance effect’ depending on the risk properties of human capital. They
derive conditions under which each effect calls for over- or underprovision of education
compared to the first-best outcome without missing insurance markets. Although the two
effects may pull in opposite directions, their main message is that education should be
overprovided if it is risk-decreasing and it should be underprovided if it is risk-increasing.
8Cremer and Gavhari (1995a, 1995b) also demonstrate that the optimal (linear) commodity tax is
non-uniform under both linear and non-linear income taxation, when one of the commodities is consumed
before the realization of risk and the other thereafter. If we interpret these commodities as consumption
today and consumption tomorrow, the result is immediate. Hence, intertemporal wedges or capital
income taxes are optimal.
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Da Costa and Maestri (2007) and Anderberg (2008) also build on the Eaton-Rosen-
Hamilton model, but now assume that human capital investments can be verified by the
government so that it can employ non-linear education policies, besides non-linear policy
instruments on labor income and capital income. These authors confirm earlier findings
by Golosov et al. (2003) that there is optimally an intertemporal wedge on consumption
(i.e., a role for capital income taxation). Similarly, labor supply carries a wedge for social
insurance purposes. Da Costa and Maestri (2007) argue that education policy should
ensure social efficiency in human capital investment. Anderberg (2008) concludes this
result to be erroneous. Aggregate human capital investment should be optimally distorted
in a way that depends on the shape of the earnings function similar to Anderberg and
Andersson (2003).
Taken together, all these papers show that social insurance is desirable, but that a
moral hazard problem in labor supply prevents full insurance. Moreover, in principle there
is a welfare enhancing role for education policy. Levhari and Weiss (1974), Anderberg
and Andersson (2003) and Anderberg (2008) show that the nature of human capital risk
is critical for both individual behavior and tax and education policy. But what does the
optimal income tax look like? An explicit analysis of the role of education subsidies to
implement the optimal second-best allocation as a market outcome is still missing. How
should education policies be designed if the government implements the second-best with
linear education subsidies? And, finally, how do the optimal linear income taxes and
linear education subsidies depend on the risk properties of human capital? The rest of
this paper is devoted to answer these questions.
3 The Model
3.1 Preferences and Technologies
Following Levhari and Weiss (1974), mainly two-period models are analyzed in the lit-
erature. There is a continuum of ex-ante identical individuals, who have to decide on
their educational investment, labor supply and consumption. In the first period, indi-
viduals have a unit time endowment, which is spent on investment in education (e), and
work (1 − e). wo is the wage per year worked. Consequently, individuals forego labor
earnings while learning.9 Generally, there is no labor-leisure decision in the first period,
only in the second. Apart from investing in education, individuals may also save (or bor-
row). Savings are denoted by a. Capital markets for borrowing and lending are perfect.
9Without any loss of generality we could also allow for direct costs of education, besides opportunity
costs, as long as all educational investments are verifiable and can be subsidized (cf. Bovenberg and
Jacobs, 2003, 2005).
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Consequently, we can write the first-period budget constraint as
co = ω + wo(1− e)− a, (1)
where co is consumption in the first period, and ω is an exogenous initial income endow-
ment.
In the second period, individuals supply labor and consume their savings plus labor
incomes. Gross labor income is represented by a general earnings function, which depends
on labor l and education e:
Φ(θ, l, e), Φe,Φl > 0, Φee < 0, Φll ≤ 0. (2)
θ is an idiosyncratic shock drawn from a probability distribution f(θ). Therefore, both
income and the returns to education are risky. We assume that, for any given value of
θ, the marginal returns to education are positive and decreasing. Similarly, the marginal
returns to labor effort are positive and non-increasing. Furthermore, the random variable
θ is assumed to have a positive effect on income: Φθ > 0. In the remainder of the
analysis, we focus on the two cases identified in the literature: (i) educational investment
itself causes and amplifies income risks (Φθe > 0), and (ii) educational investment hedges
against income risks (Φθe < 0). The second-period budget constraint thus reads as
c = Φ(θ, l, e) + (1 + r)a, (3)
where c is consumption in the second period, and r is the constant real interest rate. We
abstract from taxes on saving and refer to Hamilton (1987) for that case.
Households derive utility from consumption and disutility from labor. They maximize
a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function
E [U(co, c, l)], Uco , Uc,−Ul > 0, Ucoco, Ucc,−Ull ≤ 0, (4)
where E denotes the expectation operator, i.e., E [X] ≡
∫
Θ
Xdf(θ) where Θ is the set
of values for θ. U is assumed to be strictly concave, three times differentiable, and it
satisfies the Inada conditions.
We reduce this basic two-period model to its canonical form by making the following
innocent assumptions. Firstly, we treat first-period consumption co as exogenously fixed
as in Eaton and Rosen (1980b). Moreover, we set it equal to zero (co = 0), for the reason
that the intertemporal allocation of consumption is only of secondary interest if capital
markets are perfect. Secondly, we normalize the interest rate to zero, r = 0, for the
same reason. Thirdly, we normalize the first-period wage rate to one (wo = 1), which is
harmless. Fourthly, we assume that the income endowment is equal to ω = −w0 = −1.
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Consequently, we can suppress the time endowment in the household budget constraint.
This assumption is innocent since the taxes on the time spent working in the first period
will only cause income effects and will not generate (policy relevant) substitution effects
(see also Bovenberg and Jacobs, 2003).
In addition, we assume that social insurance takes place through a linear tax system
with a positive marginal tax rate t and a lump-sum transfer T , which can be seen as a
negative income tax or a basic income. Furthermore, we introduce a flat rate subsidy
s on the opportunity costs of education (forgone earnings). Moreover, all educational
investments are fully tax deductible. Hence, under our assumptions, net life-time income
of the representative household is given by
c = (1− t) [Φ(θ, l, e)− (1− s)e] + T. (5)
We further assume that utility is additively separable in consumption and labor sup-
ply, and we suppress first-period consumption in the utility function:
U ≡ E [u(c)− v(l)] , u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, v′ > 0, v′′ > 0. (6)
The sub-utility function of consumption is increasing and concave, whereas the disutility
function of labor supply is increasing and convex. Furthermore, we impose the Inada-
conditions on both utility functions to avoid corner solutions.
The timing structure of the model is as follows. The government sets the proportional
tax rate t, the subsidy rate s and the lump-sum transfer T before the choices of house-
holds and the revelation of the risk θ. Moreover, educational investment e and labor
supply l are simultaneously chosen before risk realizes.10 Labor supply can therefore be
used as insurance device in order to reduce exposure to income risks – analogously to
education. After that, (income) risk realizes, incomes are earned and consumption takes
place. Consequently, only consumption is stochastic, while working time and education
are deterministic.
3.2 Households
The household’s unconstrained maximization problem can be obtained upon substitution
of the household budget constraint in the utility function:
max
{e,l}
U(e, l) ≡ E [u((1− t) [Φ(θ, l, e)− (1− s)e] + T )]− v(l), (7)
10It can be shown that a timing sequence in which labor supply is chosen after uncertainty has been
resolved does not change any of the results qualitatively, cf. Cremer and Gavhari (1995a), and Anderberg
and Andersson (2003).
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The first-order conditions for this maximization problem are given by
E [u′ (.) (Φe (.)− (1− s))] = 0, (8)
(1− t)E [u′(.)Φl (.)]− v
′(l) = 0. (9)
These equations can be rewritten by employing the risk premia in education and labor
supply:
pie ≡ −
cov [u′ (.) ,Φe (.)]
E [u′(.)] E [Φe (.)]
, (10)
pil ≡ −
cov [u′ (.) ,Φl (.)]
E [u′(.)] E [Φl (.)]
. (11)
pie is the negative of the normalized covariance between marginal utility of consumption
and marginal return of human capital. A positive risk premium implies that education
increases income risk, since pie > 0 corresponds to Φθe > 0. A negative risk premium
pie < 0, instead, mirrors a risk-reducing effect of education, due to Φθe < 0. Similarly, pil
is the negative of the normalized covariance between marginal utility of consumption and
marginal return to labor, representing the risk premium in labor supply. Its interpretation
is analogous to the risk premium in educational investment. Note that if individuals would
be risk-neutral, both risk premia would be zero. Similarly, risk premia are zero if the
marginal returns to education or labor are not state-dependent, i.e., when there is no
risk. Both risk premia are also zero when the risk-factor θ enters the earnings function
in an additively separable fashion (Φθe = Φθl = 0), since education and labor supply do
not affect income risk in that case.
Using the definition of pie, the first-order condition (8) can be written as
(1− pie)E [Φe (θ, l, e)] = 1− s. (12)
The risk-adjusted expected marginal return to education is equal to the marginal cost of
education. Note that the tax system does not directly affect investment in education, since
all costs of education are tax deductible. However, taxation generally affects investment
in education indirectly via labor supply. More labor supply raises the returns to human
capital investments as long as Φel > 0. This is the case for all earnings functions discussed
in the literature (cf. Jacobs and Bovenberg, 2008). Education subsidies naturally boost
educational investments, since they reduce marginal cost.
If income is risky, the expected marginal return of education can be either higher or
lower than marginal costs, depending on the sign of the risk premium pie. If education
increases exposure to labor market risk, pie > 0, individuals command a positive risk-
premium on their educational investment. Hence, from a social point of view, risk-averse
individuals invest too little in education. Missing insurance markets for human capital
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related income risk thus create an implicit tax on human capital investment. If income
risk decreases with education, individuals command a negative risk-premium on their
educational investment, pie < 0. In that case, risk-averse individuals invest too much
in education in order to reduce their exposure to labor market risk. If human capital
investments hedge against labor market risk, missing insurance markets create an implicit
subsidy on human capital investments. If there is no income risk, condition (12) reduces
to Φe (.) = 1−s, which is the optimality condition for investment in human capital under
certainty.
The first-order condition for labor supply (9) can be rewritten using pil:
v′(l)
E [u′(.)]
= (1− t)(1− pil)E [Φl (θ, l, e)] . (13)
The marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor must be equal to the
risk adjusted net wage. A higher tax rate reduces the incentives to supply labor. Note that
if education raises the wage rate, incentives to supply labor are stronger when individuals
are better educated. Thus, education and labor are complementary as long as Φel > 0.
If an increase in labor supply increases risk, pil > 0, individuals supply less labor than is
socially efficient. If labor supply decreases the exposure to risk (pil < 0), the risk premium
turns negative, leading to socially inefficient precautionary labor supply. Again, the risk
premium acts as an implicit tax (subsidy) on labor if labor supply increases (reduces)
exposure to labor market risk, i.e., if pil > 0 (pil < 0).
In general, the second-order conditions for individual optimization are not automati-
cally satisfied due to the interaction between learning and working. This generates non-
linear budget sets in which interior solutions are not guaranteed. Define ρ ≡ −u′′ (.) /u′ (.)
as the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion and Φ˜e (.) ≡ Φe (.) − (1 − s) as
the net marginal return to education. Then, we find that the second-order condition for
expected utility maximization is given by (see Appendix A.1)
E
[
u′
(
Φel − (1− t)ρΦlΦ˜e
)]2
< E
[
u′
(
Φee − (1− t)ρΦ˜
2
e
)]
(14)
×
[
E
[
u′
(
Φll − (1− t)ρΦ
2
l
)]
−
v′′
(1− t)
]
.
The right-hand side is generally positive, since both bracketed terms are negative: Φee (.) <
0, Φll (.) < 0 and Φ˜
2
e (.) > 0, Φ
2
l (.) > 0, v
′′ (.) > 0. If the right-hand side is positive,
the left-hand side should be sufficiently small. That is the case if the complementarity
between education and labor is weak (low Φel) and absolute risk-aversion ρ is sufficiently
large. This is intuitive as a stronger complementarity raises the strength of the feedback
between learning and working. Weaker risk-aversion also generates a stronger feedback,
since individuals who tolerate more risk will respond more elastically to changes in incen-
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tives. In the remainder we assume that the second-order conditions are always satisfied.
3.3 Government
We assume a benevolent government with full commitment, which maximizes social wel-
fare by optimally choosing linear tax and education policies. The informational assump-
tions for employing linear instruments are that only aggregate incomes and education
choices need to be verifiable to the government. We abstract from (exogenous) govern-
ment spending without loss of generality.
The government budget constraint is given by
E [t (Φ (.)− (1− s)e)− T − se] = 0. (15)
All tax revenues are used to finance the lump-sum transfers and education subsidies.
Since income risk is idiosyncratic, tax revenue is deterministic according to the law of
large numbers and tax revenue equals its expected value. We abstract from any systematic
risk.11
Social welfare is (ex ante) expected indirect utility V (.) of the representative house-
hold:
V (T, t, s) ≡ E
[
u
(
(1− t)
[
Φ(θ, lˆ, eˆ)− (1− s)eˆ
]
+ T
)]
− v(lˆ), (16)
where hats denote the optimized values for l and e. For later reference, we apply Roy’s
lemma to find the derivatives of the indirect utility function: ∂V (.)
∂T
= E [u′ (.)], ∂V (.)
∂t
=
−E [u′ (.) (Φ (.)− (1− s)e)], and ∂V (.)
∂s
= E [u′ (.)](1− t)e.
4 Optimal Tax and Education Policies
The Lagrangian for maximization of social welfare is given by
max
{T,t,s}
L ≡ E [V (T, t, s) + η (t (Φ (θ, l, e)− (1− s)e)− se− T )] , (17)
where η denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the government budget constraint (15).
In order to characterize the optimal solutions for the optimal tax and subsidy rates,
we introduce the following tax wedges on labor and education:
∆l ≡ tΦl (.) , (18)
∆e ≡ t (Φe (.)− (1− s))− s. (19)
11Adding systematic (aggregate) income risks would make the government budget risky. This should
not affect our main findings on insuring the idiosyncratic part of risk, but may require an additional
insurance device in the form of public consumption. Part of the systematic risk can then be diversified
by smoothing aggregate shocks over private and public consumption, see Kaplow (1994).
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∆l (∆e) measures the increase in tax revenue (measured in monetary units) if labor supply
(education) is raised with one unit.
The first-order conditions for this maximization problem are given by:
∂L
∂T
= E
[
∂V (.)
∂T
− η + η∆l
∂l
∂T
+ η∆e
∂e
∂T
]
= 0, (20)
∂L
∂t
= E
[
∂V (.)
∂t
+ η (Φ (.)− (1− s)e) + η∆l
∂l
∂t
+ η∆e
∂e
∂t
]
= 0, (21)
∂L
∂s
= E
[
∂V (.)
∂s
− η(1− t)e+ η∆l
∂l
∂s
+ η∆e
∂e
∂s
]
= 0. (22)
In the remainder of this section, we first analyze optimal tax and education policies
separately. Then, we derive the optimal structure of both tax and education policies
simultaneously.
4.1 Optimal Lump-sum Transfer
Using Roy’s lemma we obtain from (20):
E
[
u′
η
+∆l
∂l
∂T
+∆e
∂e
∂T
]
= 1. (23)
Hence, the expected social marginal value of a unit increase in lump-sum income, includ-
ing the income effects on the tax base, should be equal to its resource costs, which equal
unity. This corresponds to the standard condition for the optimal lump-sum transfer in
optimal income taxation models (e.g., in Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980).
4.2 Optimal Taxation
This section derives the optimal level of social insurance in the absence of education pol-
icy (s¯ = 0). Analogously to Feldstein’s distributional characteristic (see, e.g., Feldstein,
1972, or Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980) and in correspondence with Anderberg and Ander-
sson (2003), we define the ‘insurance characteristic’ ξ as the negative of the normalized
covariance between gross income Φ and the private marginal value of income u′:
ξ ≡ −
cov [Φ, u′]
E [Φ] E [u′]
. (24)
The insurance characteristic ξ measures the (marginal) gain in social welfare of having
one euro more income insurance. A positive insurance characteristic implies that lucky
individuals, having high incomes after realization of risk, have a lower marginal utility
of income, and unlucky individuals, having low incomes ex post, have a high marginal
utility of income. Consequently, cov [Φ, u′] < 0. Reducing the variance in gross earnings
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by means of redistributive income taxes thus raises social welfare. Indeed, ξ = 0 if the
government is not concerned about income insurance and all individuals have the same
marginal utility of income u′, or if household income Φ is deterministic, and there is no
ex post inequality.
Using Roy’s lemma and the risk-adjusted Slutsky equations, we can find the optimal
tax rate from (21) at the optimal T (see Appendix A.3):
t
1− t
=
ξ
εlt + pieεet
, (25)
where εlt = −
E[Φl]l
E[Φ]
∂l∗
∂t
1−t
l
and εet = −
E[Φe]e
E[Φ]
∂e∗
∂t
1−t
e
are the expected utility compensated
elasticities of labor supply and education (see Appendix A.2). These are weighted by the
expected earnings shares of labor and education in total earnings. The expression in (25)
shows the trade-off between insurance and efficiency. The optimal tax on labor equates
the marginal benefits of income insurance (ξ) with the marginal costs of providing it. The
optimal tax rate increases when the government attaches a larger social value to income
insurance as measured by a higher ξ.
The marginal costs consist of two terms: (i) tax-induced distortions on labor supply
t
1−t
εlt, and (ii) a fiscal externality,
t
1−t
pieεet, stemming from the missing insurance mar-
kets.12 The optimal tax decreases if the distortions in labor supply become more severe as
indicated by a higher elasticity εlt. Indeed, if labor supply (and educational investments)
would be completely inelastic (εlt = εet = 0), the optimal tax rate would be one hundred
percent (t = 1).
The optimal tax rate is also determined by the tax elasticity of investments in edu-
cation, as can be seen from the presence of the term pieεet. In particular, the income tax
may exacerbate or mitigate the non-tax distortions arising from the missing insurance
markets. If education increases the exposure to labor market risk, the risk premium acts
as if there is a pre-existing implicit tax on educational investment (pie > 0). If educational
investments hedge against labor market risk, the risk premium acts as if there is a pre-
existing implicit subsidy on educational investment (pie < 0). Provided that investment
in human capital falls with a higher tax rate (εet > 0)
13, a higher income tax thus exacer-
bates (mitigates) underinvestment (overinvestment) in human capital if pie > 0 (pie < 0).
The implicit tax (or subsidy) on education due to non-insurable income risks, thereby,
creates a fiscal externality in the presence of positive income taxes.
This can be seen most clearly from the (expected) tax wedge on education E [∆e], which
12Following Heller and Starrett (1976), we interpret the (fiscal) impact of allocative distortions resulting
from a missing market as an externality. Our fiscal externality thus affects the government budget only
in the case of non-zero taxes.
13Although the tax system does not affect human capital investments directly, it does so indirectly by
lowering labor supply as long as labor and education are complementary in generating gross income (i.e.,
Φel > 0).
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measures the gain in tax revenue available for redistribution if human capital investment
increases by one unit. By applying the first-order equation for optimal human capital
investment (12), we can rewrite the expected net tax wedge on education as
E [∆e]|s=0 =
pie
1− pie
t. (26)
pie
1−pie
represents the risk wedge on human capital investment. If there is underinvestment
(pie > 0) the social marginal benefits of an additional unit invested in education are larger
than its social marginal costs. Consequently, the cost of the tax deduction on the marginal
costs of the investment is smaller than the tax revenue from the marginal benefits of the
investment in education, i.e., E [∆e]|s=0 > 0. Income taxation will exacerbate socially
undesirable underinvestment by further reducing educational investments below first-best
levels (if εet > 0), which decreases tax-revenues. Consequently, optimal tax rates are set
lower (ceteris paribus). In the case of overinvestment (pie < 0), the opposite holds true.
In particular, the public cost of the tax deduction on the marginal costs of the investment
is larger than the marginal revenue generated by taxing the returns to education, i.e.,
E [∆e]|s=0 < 0. Social insurance thus reduces socially undesirable overinvestment in
human capital (if εet > 0). Optimal tax rates are set higher as a result (ceteris paribus).
If education has no effect on the exposure to risk, there is no risk-premium on human
capital investment (pie = 0). Thus, the implicit tax on education is zero, because all costs
are deductible against the rate at which returns are taxed. Hence, the fiscal externality
vanishes. In that case, the optimal tax is only determined by the labor supply elasticity.14
We find the results of Eaton and Rosen (1980b) if we assume that the earnings function
exhibits multiplicative risk. The latter implies that education will always increase the
exposure to risk and there will be underinvestment, i.e., pie > 0. However, Eaton and
Rosen (1980b, pp. 712-714) do not derive an explicit expression for the optimal tax
rate. We show that the optimal income tax is downward biased due to the negative
fiscal externality (pie > 0), which is a novel finding. If we assume that human capital
investment is exogenous (εet = pie = 0), we obtain the outcome of Eaton and Rosen
(1980a): t
1−t
= ξ
εlt
. This formula captures the trade-off between insurance and labor
supply distortions. The next proposition summarizes our findings from this subsection.
Proposition 1. The optimal income tax trades off social insurance against the incentives
to work, the incentives to invest in human capital, and the internalization of the fiscal
externality stemming from missing insurance markets. If education increases exposure
to labor market risk, the income tax exacerbates the distortions of missing insurance
markets on human capital investment. If education reduces exposure to labor market risk,
14The tax distortions in labor supply are still typically higher than in standard models without en-
dogenous human capital investment, as long as education and labor are complementary in earnings, see,
e.g., Jacobs (2005).
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the income tax mitigates the distortions of missing insurance markets on human capital
investment.
4.3 Optimal Education Policy
This section derives the optimal education policy for a given level of taxation t¯. In doing
so, we gain the intuition for the optimal structure of taxes and subsidies when both
policy instruments are simultaneously optimized. By using Roy’s lemma and the Slutsky
equations, we can rearrange the first-order condition for education subsidies (22) to find
the optimal subsidy rate at optimal T , for a given t¯ (see Appendix A.4)
s
1− s
=
( εls
εes
1− pie
+
pie
1− pie
)
t¯. (27)
εls =
E[Φl(.)]l
E[Φ(.)]
∂l∗
∂s
1−s
l
and εes =
E[Φe(.)]e
E[Φ(.)]
∂e∗
∂s
1−s
e
denote the expected utility compensated
elasticities of labor and education with respect to the education subsidy. These elasticities
are again weighted by the expected shares of labor and education in total earnings.
The insurance characteristic is absent in the expression for optimal education subsi-
dies. In contrast to the optimal income tax – see previous section – there is no gain in
using education subsidies for insurance. Education subsidies are not used at all (s = 0)
when the income tax is zero (t¯ = 0). In that case, the only way households can reduce
their exposure to risk is to self-insure, i.e., to over- or underinvest in education. This self-
insurance is chosen optimally. Education subsidies do not yield additional welfare gains
in absence of income taxation (t¯ = 0), because education subsidies are state-independent.
Education subsidies therefore do not directly reduce the exposure to income risk. Conse-
quently, in the absence of tax-provided social insurance, the government cannot improve
market outcomes by subsidizing education as this policy would only upset the optimal
private responses of individuals to income risk.
There is a role for education policy, however, when the government organizes social
insurance through an income tax system (t¯ > 0). At an exogenously given tax rate t¯ > 0,
education subsidies correct the tax-distortions of the income tax. There are two reasons
why education subsidies are optimally employed. First, labor taxation distorts labor
supply. If εls > 0 education and labor supply are complementary in generating income.
Thus, by subsidizing education, the government can indirectly boost labor supply and
thereby reduce the tax distortions on labor supply. The higher is the tax rate t, the larger
are the distortions on labor supply, and the larger is the need to fight these labor-tax
distortions with education subsidies. Similarly, if education and labor are substitutes,
εls < 0 , education should be taxed so as to increase labor supply and to off-set the tax
wedge on labor. See also Jacobs and Bovenberg (2008). In both cases the government
trades off fewer tax-induced distortions on labor supply against larger subsidy-induced
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distortions in educational investment. The higher is the cross-elasticity of labor supply
with respect to the education subsidy (εls), the more effective education subsidies are to
fight labor-tax distortions indirectly and the higher education subsidies should be. In
addition, the more education responds to subsidies (larger εes), the larger is the social
cost of undesirable overinvestment, and the lower is the optimal education subsidy.
Second, the education subsidy internalizes the fiscal externality, which is caused by
the implicit tax on educational investment arising from missing insurance markets. This
effect is represented by the second term, pie
1−pie
t¯, in equation (27). Note that this term
equals the implicit tax wedge on education in equation (26), E [∆e]|s=0, where education
subsidies are absent. Consequently, the education subsidy fully internalizes the fiscal
externality arising from under- or overinvestment in human capital in the presence of
income taxes. The higher is the exogenously given labor tax rate t¯ > 0, the larger is
the fiscal externality due to the implicit tax pie
1−pie
on human capital. If education is risk-
increasing, pie > 0, education should be subsidized more in order to internalize the fiscal
externality. If education has a risk-mitigating effect, pie < 0, there is an implicit subsidy
on human capital which is ceteris paribus off-set by an explicit tax on education.
By combining these two arguments, it becomes apparent that optimal education sub-
sidies are unambiguously positive when education and labor supply are complementary
(εls > 0) and there is underinvestment in education (pie > 0). In that case, education
subsidies help to reduce both tax distortions in labor supply and to internalize the fiscal
externality of underinvestment in education. If, on the other hand, education hedges
against labor market risks (pie < 0) the two arguments pull in opposite directions as
long as education and labor remain complementary (εls > 0). Therefore, the sign of the
education subsidy cannot be unambiguously determined. In particular, education should
be taxed if εls
εes
< −pie. In that case, socially undesirable overinvestment in education is
relatively large compared to the complementarity of education with labor supply.
These findings are related to the ‘Siamese twins’ intuition in Bovenberg and Jacobs
(2005). In particular, education policies are optimally employed to off-set the distortions
arising from social insurance. Provided that optimal education subsidies are non-negative
( εls
εes
+pie > 0), more aggressive social insurance (larger t) requires higher education subsi-
dies (and vice versa). However, the intuition for our findings is different than Bovenberg
and Jacobs (2005) for two reasons. First, education subsidies do not generate inequality
since everyone is identical ex ante.15 Consequently, education should be subsidized on a
net basis if education and labor are complementary (ceteris paribus). In Bovenberg and
Jacobs (2005) education is not subsidized on a net basis, because subsidizing education
of ex ante differing individuals generates more inequality due to the ability bias in educa-
tion. Jacobs and Bovenberg (2008) show that both effects (lower tax wedge on labor and
more inequality) cancel out exactly, and education subsidies are optimally zero (on a net
15This is also the reason why education subsidies are not used for insurance.
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basis) with their assumptions on the earnings function. Second, there are two distortions
on human capital investment in the current model. The tax system distorts labor supply
and missing insurance markets distort human capital investment. The latter mechanism
is absent in Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005). This paper shows that this provides a novel
channel in which either education subsidies or education taxes may be used to internalize
the fiscal externalities arising from over- or underinvestment in human capital.
Proposition 2. Education subsidies do not provide income insurance and are only used
for efficiency reasons in order to offset the distortions of income taxes on labor sup-
ply and educational investment. First, education subsidies help to off-set the tax-induced
distortions of social insurance on labor supply when education and work effort are comple-
mentary. Education subsidies are higher if labor and education are more complementary.
Second, education subsidies (taxes) are used to internalize the fiscal externality resulting
from socially undesirable underinvestment (overinvestment) in human capital in the ab-
sence of insurance markets. Optimal education subsidies are higher (lower) if there is
more under- (over-)investment in human capital.
4.4 Optimal Tax Cum Education Policy
By combining the expressions for the optimal tax and education policies (46) and (48)
from Appendices A.3 and A.4 we obtain the optimal tax rate tˆ and education subsidies
sˆ if the government simultaneously optimizes income taxes and education subsidies:
tˆ
1− tˆ
=
ξ
εlt −
εls
εes
εet
, (28)
sˆ
1− sˆ
=
( εls
εes
1− pie
+
pie
1− pie
)
tˆ. (29)
Note that all statements in section 4.3 about the optimal education subsidy for given
tax policy carry over to the case in which optimal tax and education policies are simul-
taneously derived. For this reason we do not discuss this expression further and refer
to the previous section. We therefore bolster Anderberg’s (2008) findings that the risk
properties of human capital are crucial for the design of optimal human capital policies.
While Anderberg (2008) considers a general set of information-rich non-linear policy in-
struments, our analysis shows that the risk properties of human capital are also key for
optimal human capital policies under linear policy instruments, which are less informa-
tionally demanding. Optimal education policies will not ensure aggregate efficiency in
human capital investment, since not all income risk will be fully diversified. Moreover,
our analysis points out that the fiscal externalities associated with missing insurance
markets are crucial for the design of educational policy.
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The optimal tax rate tˆ is no longer directly affected by the risk-wedge, since, com-
pared to equation (25), the risk premium in education pie ceases to enter the optimal tax
formula. Hence, the income tax no longer exacerbates underinvestment if pie > 0 and no
longer mitigates overinvestment if pie < 0. The expression for the optimal income tax
indeed confirms that the education subsidy perfectly internalizes the fiscal externality
arising from under- or overinvestment in human capital. Education subsidies are a more
efficient instrument to internalize the fiscal externality than income taxes, since the latter
also distort labor supply. This finding mirrors the results on optimal taxation in the pres-
ence of externalities by Sandmo (1975, pp. 92, 95). He shows that externalities should
optimally be internalized by only correcting the price of the commodity which causes
the externality in an additive way (‘additive property’). In our case this ‘commodity’
is education. We also find that the correction term enters additively in the optimal tax
expression.
The interpretation of the optimal tax rate therefore changes slightly, since it is now
exclusively used for insurance purposes. Naturally, the optimal tax rate still increases
in the marginal benefits of insurance (ξ) and decreases in higher tax-induced distortions
in labor supply (εlt). The new optimal tax expression (28), however, reveals that the
optimal income tax increases if education and labor supply become more complementary
as indicated by εls
εes
. See also the expression for the optimal education subsidy. Education
subsidies boost labor supply if εls > 0 and thereby help to off-set the tax distortions on
labor effort. Consequently, income taxes increase (ceteris paribus). If education responds
very elastically to education subsidies, εes is large, optimal tax rates are lower, since
subsidies are more distortionary and exacerbate overinvestment in education. If there is
no income risk or if the government is not concerned about risk, ξ = 0, there is no income
taxation, implying that education subsidies are also zero (tˆ = sˆ = 0), because in that
case there are neither tax distortions nor fiscal externalities.
The optimal use of education policy does not unambiguously increase optimal income
tax rates (for given ξ) as can be inferred from comparing the optimal tax policy cum
education subsidies, in equation (28), with the optimal tax rate in equation (25), where
education policy is absent (s = 0). Intuitively, one would expect the optimal tax rate
to be higher if the government has more instruments. This conclusion is not necessarily
valid in the current second-best setting with multiple distortions. Indeed, the intuition is
only confirmed for the case where pie > 0. Without education subsidies, income taxation
exacerbates the non-tax distortions from missing insurance markets, which causes a neg-
ative fiscal externality. A lower tax rate is thus optimal. With optimal education policy
internalizing the fiscal externality, the optimal income tax is unambiguously higher (even
if εls = 0). However, in the case of overinvestment in human capital due to missing insur-
ance markets (pie < 0), the income tax features a positive fiscal externality by mitigating
distortions in human capital investment. When education subsidies, or even education
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taxes (e.g., if εls = 0), are available, there is, however, no longer a role for the income tax
to correct for overinvestment in human capital. As a result optimal income taxes may
well be lower. The following proposition summarizes our findings.
Proposition 3. If labor and education are more complementary, both the optimal tax
rate and optimal education subsidies increase. If the risk premium on education rises,
there is a rise in optimal education subsidies as well. If labor supply and education
are complementary and there is underinvestment in education due to missing insurance
markets, education policy allows for more social insurance compared to tax policy alone.
If education hedges against labor market risk, optimal tax rates with education policy could
be lower than without education policy if the complementarity between education and labor
is sufficiently weak.
Our findings are importantly related to Hamilton (1987), Anderberg and Andersson
(2003) and Anderberg (2008). Hamilton (1987) extends Eaton and Rosen (1980b) and
analyzes capital taxes as an indirect education subsidy. Hamilton (1987) is right in
pointing out that there remains underinvestment in education when income taxes are
optimally set. Consequently, a capital tax could be welfare enhancing, because a capital
tax is an indirect education subsidy. Since we assume that education is verifiable, we can
allow for direct education subsidies. We have shown that the role for education policy is to
internalize the fiscal externality associated with underinvestment. Therefore, we are able
to show that the use of education subsidies is always welfare enhancing. Hamilton (1987)
needs strong assumptions (constant absolute risk aversion and inelastic labor supply) to
show that his education policy is desirable, since capital taxes also distort savings in
contrast to education subsidies.16
Anderberg and Andersson’s (2003) analysis is closest to ours, the major difference
being that these authors assume that the government can impose a mandatory level of
education centrally. Consequently, there is no fiscal externality in human capital invest-
ment – which explains the absence of the risk premium in their optimal tax formula (in
equation 11). Education policy then has an insurance effect, because it replaces self-
insurance of households in a decentralized setting. Anderberg and Andersson (2003, p.
1523) state that “The insight is thus that if education moderates wage uncertainty, a
second-best policy should, rather unambiguously, encourage the formation of human cap-
ital (relative to the first-best), while if education exacerbates wage uncertainty the overall
conclusion is ambiguous.” Though this statement is correct, it would be misleading to
conclude that education subsidies (or taxes) would be an optimal policy when education
decisions are made at the decentralized level. Indeed, if households choose educational
16In the absence of risk, Jacobs and Bovenberg (2005) show that capital needs to be taxed if educational
investment cannot be verified, even when labor supply is endogenous and much weaker restrictions are
imposed on the utility function.
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investment themselves, there is no insurance effect of educational policy. More impor-
tantly, the novel finding of our paper is that in the presence of income taxation, there
will be socially ‘excessive’ overinvestment (underinvestment) by households, compared to
the constrained second-best optimal amount of overinvestment (underinvestment). This,
ceteris paribus, calls for a policy that discourages (encourages) educational investment.
Even under linear policy instruments it can be misleading to obtain policy recommen-
dations from looking at the optimal wedges on individual choices and comparing these
with the first-best choice-rules. The policy implementation in our setting is the polar
opposite of what the wedges on education seem to suggest. As has also been stressed by
Golosov et al. (2003, 2006), there is generally no clear-cut correspondence between tax
wedges and tax rates that would implement optimal second-best allocations. We believe
that this could also be an important issue in the recent papers in the new dynamic public
finance tradition (see, e.g., da Costa and Maestri, 2007, and Anderberg, 2008). In light
of this discussion, we rephrase our results in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. From a positive (negative) tax wedge on education compared to the first-
best level cannot be concluded that education should be subsidized (taxed) if human capital
investment is made at the decentralized level and the government only has indirect control
over individual choices via subsidies and taxes.
5 Conclusions
This paper analyzed optimal social insurance and education policy. The optimal income
tax strikes a balance between benefits of social insurance and the distortions in labor sup-
ply. The optimal income tax is higher if education and work are more complementary,
since the government can indirectly off-set labor-tax distortions by subsidizing educa-
tion. Optimal education subsidies unambiguously increase if education and labor are
more complementary. In that case, subsidies on education are a more attractive instru-
ment to fight tax distortions on labor supply. The optimal income tax is not determined
by the risk properties of human capital, but optimal education policies are. Education
subsidies are not used to off-set under- or overinvestment in human capital in the ab-
sence of taxation, because this would upset the optimal private response to market risks.
However, the non-insurable risk due to missing insurance markets gives rise to a fiscal
externality from income taxation. Boosting education yields more (less) tax revenues if
there is underinvestment (overinvestment) in human capital. Subsidizing (taxing) educa-
tion is optimal in order to internalize the fiscal externality originating from the missing
insurance markets, ceteris paribus. If education is a risky activity there is a strong role
for subsidizing education on a net basis to off-set the distortions of social insurance on
human capital investments. Social insurance will then increase. However, if education
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hedges against labor market risk, the case for education subsidies is weakened, and social
insurance may even be reduced compared to the outcome in the absence of education
subsidies.
Whether education subsidies or education taxes should be employed is an empirical
question that can only be answered by knowing the risk-properties of human capital. In
reality, both risk-reducing and risk-increasing education types appear to be present, see
also the discussion in section 2. For example, lawyers may be subject to less income
risk than construction workers. Optimal education policies should generally differentiate
between education types and need to be tailored to the risk-properties of each type of
education. Future research could extend the current model to a two-period setting in
order to analyze linear capital taxes, besides education subsidies. Further, the model
could be used to analyze time-consistent education policies as in Pereira (2008).
A Appendix
A.1 Second-order Conditions in Household Optimization
U denotes expected utility of individuals:
U(e, l) = E [u((1− t) [Φ(θ, l, e)− (1− s)e] + T )]− v(l). (30)
The first-order conditions for the optimal choices of education and labor are given by
Ue = (1− t)E [u
′(Φe − (1− s))] = 0, (31)
Ul = (1− t)E [u
′Φl]− v
′ = 0. (32)
First-order conditions are necessary, but not sufficient. The Hessian matrix H of the
second-order partial derivatives can be written as
H ≡
[
E [u′Φee + u
′′(1− t)(Φe − (1− s))
2] E [u′Φel + u
′′(1− t)Φl(Φe − (1− s))]
E [u′Φel + u
′′(1− t)Φl(Φe − (1− s))] E [u
′Φll + u
′′(1− t)Φ2l ]−
v′′
(1−t)
]
.
(33)
For utility to reach a maximum the Hessian matrix should be negative definite. Hence, the
leading principal minors should switch signs. The first leading principal minor is always
negative (Uee < 0), due to diminishing returns to education (Φee < 0) and concavity
of the utility function (u′′ < 0). The second leading principal minor must therefore be
positive. Hence, the second-order conditions are summarized by UeeUll − U
2
el > 0. Upon
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substitution of the second derivatives, we can state the second-order condition as
E [u′Φel + u
′′(1− t)Φl(Φe − (1− s))]
2
(34)
< E
[
u′Φee + u
′′(1− t)(Φe − (1− s))
2
] (
E
[
u′Φll + u
′′(1− t)Φ2l
]
− v′′/(1− t)
)
.
Rewriting yields the expression in the text.
A.2 Deriving Slutsky Equations under Risk
In order to derive the expected utility compensated substitution effects, we calculate
how much lump-sum income ω an individual should receive (pay) in order to keep its
expected utility constant when either the tax rate or the subsidy rate changes. This is
equivalent to deriving the expenditure function and applying Shephard’s lemma. First,
totally differentiate the expected utility function at constant utility to obtain
dU = E [u′dc]− v′dl = 0. (35)
Totally differentiating the budget constraint (while allowing for lump-sum income ω)
gives
dc = − (Φ− (1− s)e) dt+ (1− t) (Φe − (1− s)) de+ (1− t)eds+ (1− t)Φldl+ dω. (36)
Substitution of the last expression into the differentiated utility function, and using the
first-order conditions for utility maximization, yields
−E [u′ (Φ− (1− s)e)]dt+ E [u′](1− t)eds+ E [u′] dω = 0. (37)
After applying Steiner’s Rule, and using the definition of the insurance characteristic ξ
in equation (24), the following compensations for tax and subsidy changes are obtained
dω
dt
∣∣∣∣
ds=0
=
∂ω
∂t
= (1− ξ)E [Φ]− (1− s)e, (38)
dω
ds
∣∣∣∣
dt=0
=
∂ω
∂s
= −(1− t)e. (39)
24
The Slutsky equations are, therefore, given by
∂e
∂t
=
∂e∗
∂t
−
∂ω
∂t
∂e
∂T
=
∂e∗
∂t
− ((1− ξ)E [Φ]− (1− s)e)
∂e
∂T
, (40)
∂l
∂t
=
∂l∗
∂t
−
∂ω
∂t
∂l
∂T
=
∂l∗
∂t
− ((1− ξ)E [Φ]− (1− s)e)
∂l
∂T
, (41)
∂e
∂s
=
∂e∗
∂s
−
∂ω
∂s
∂e
∂T
=
∂e∗
∂s
+ (1− t)e
∂e
∂T
, (42)
∂l
∂s
=
∂l∗
∂s
−
∂ω
∂s
∂l
∂T
=
∂l∗
∂s
+ (1− t)e
∂l
∂T
. (43)
where the asterisk (∗) denotes compensated demand and supply functions.
A.3 Optimal Taxation
We simplify the first-order condition for the tax rate t (equation (21)) by substituting
Roy’s lemma and the Slutsky equations (40) and (41) from Appendix A.2:
E [−u′ (.) (Φ (.)− (1− s)e)]
η
+ E [Φ (.)− (1− s)e] (44)
+ E [∆e]
(
∂e∗
∂t
− [(1− ξ)E [Φ (.)]− (1− s)e]
∂e
∂T
)
+ E [∆l]
(
∂l∗
∂t
− [(1− ξ)E [Φ (.)]− (1− s)e]
∂l
∂T
)
= 0.
After using Steiner’s Rule, the definition of ξ from equation (24), and substitution of the
first-order condition for T from equation (23) we find
ξE [Φ(.)] = −E [∆e]
∂e∗
∂t
− E [∆l]
∂l∗
∂t
. (45)
Substitute ∆e and ∆l from equations (19) and (18), as well as E [Φe] =
1−s
1−pie
from equation
(12), and rearrange to obtain
ξ =
t
1− t
εlt +
(
pie(s+ t(1− s))− s
(1− s)(1− t)
)
εet, (46)
where εet ≡ −
E[Φe(.)]e
E[Φ(.)]
∂e∗
∂t
1−t
e
, and εlt ≡ −
E[Φl(.)]l
E[Φ(.)]
∂l∗
∂t
1−t
l
are the negatively income weighted
expected utility compensated elasticities of education and labor with respect to the tax
rate. The elasticities are weighted by the expected shares of education and labor in
total earnings. Finally, applying s¯ = 0, rearranging and collecting terms results in the
expression in the text.
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A.4 Optimal Education Policy
We simplify the first-order condition for education by substituting Roy’s lemma and the
Slutsky equations (42) and (43) from Appendix A.2:
E
[
(1− t)e
(
u′
η
+∆l
∂l
∂T
+∆e
∂e
∂T
− 1
)]
+ E [∆e]
∂e∗
∂s
+ E [∆l]
∂l∗
∂s
= 0, (47)
Since e is not stochastic, we have E
[
(1− t)e
(
u′
η
+∆l
∂l
∂T
+∆e
∂e
∂T
− 1
)]
= 0 from the
first-order condition for T in (23). Hence,
E [∆e]e
1− s
∂e∗
∂s
1− s
e
+
E [∆l]l
1− s
∂l∗
∂s
1− s
l
= 0. (48)
Substituting ∆e and ∆l from equations (19) and (18) as well as using the first-order
condition for learning E [Φe] =
1−s
1−pie
from equation (12) results in
t¯εls +
pie(s + t¯(1− s))− s
(1− s)
εes = 0, (49)
where we defined the subsidy elasticities analogously to tax elasticities as the income
weighted expected utility compensated elasticities: εes ≡
E[Φe(.)]e
E[Φ(.)]
∂e∗
∂s
1−s
e
and εls ≡
E[Φl(.)]e
E[Φ(.)]
∂l∗
∂s
1−s
l
.
Rewriting yields the expression in the text.
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